Many models of word recognition assume that processing proceeds sequentially from analysis of form to analysis of meaning. In the context of morphological processing, this implies that morphemes are processed as units of form prior to any influence of their meanings. Some interpret the apparent absence of differences in recognition latencies to targets (SNEAK) in form and semantically similar (sneaky-SNEAK) and in form similar and semantically dissimilar (sneaker-SNEAK) prime contexts at an SOA of 48 ms as consistent with this claim. (...) To determine the time course over which degree of semantic similarity between morphologically structured primes and their targets influences recognition in the forward masked priming variant of the lexical decision paradigm, we compared facilitation for the same targets after semantically similar and dissimilar primes across a range of SOAs. The effect of shared semantics on recognition latency increased linearly with SOA when long SOAs were intermixed (Exp. 1) and latencies were significantly faster after semantically similar than dissimilar primes at homogeneous SOAs of 48 ms (Exp. 2) and 34 ms (Exp. 3). Results limit the scope of form-then-semantics models of recognition and demonstrate that semantics influences even the very early stages of recognition. Finally, once general behavior across trials has been accounted for, we fail to provide evidence for individual differences in morphological processing that can be linked to measures of reading proficiency. (shrink)

Illustrations: 1 B/w Illustration Description: This is a comprehensive, critical and comparative study of all aspects of the philosophy and religion of Sri Caitanya. In the first three chapters the history of the Vaisnava religion is traced from the earliest Vedic period to pre-Caitanya Vaisnavism in Bengal and some controversies regarding the life of Sri Caitanya and the Sampradaya or the sect to which he belongs are set at rest. In the succeeding chapters the problems of philosophy and religion are (...) discussed in detail. It is shown how Sri Caitanya breathes a new spirit into philosophy and religion by transcending the narrow and mutually conflicting 'isms' and dogmas and reconciling them in a higher synthesis by means of the concept of the absolute as Bhagavan and the doctrine of Acintya-bhedabheda or inconceivable identity-indifference. The importance of Bhakti as the exclusive means of attaining God is His highest and sweetest form is stressed. Prema or divine love is distinguished from eroticism and established as the highest end. The doctrine of Rasa or transcendental relish is explained and Parakiya Rasa is established as the highest Rasa. (shrink)

The results of education in the conditions of collective creative interaction are discussed. The results of research of the self-image, an image of the senior companion, images of the good and the bad man in consciousness of children and adult, present and former members of the children’s organization working by a technique of collective creative education are presented.

It appears to be a generally accepted opinion among modern historians that the expedition which the Athenians led up-Nile in 459 B.C. in support of the Egyptian insurrection against Persia was an exceptionally large one, numbering no less than 200 sail. Modern authors also seem to imply, though they may not say so explicitly, that the whole of this armada was involved in the catastrophe which overtook the rebels in 454 B.C.

Taken together with my previous articles [77], [80] devoted to the history of finite random sums and to Laplace's theory of errors, this paper sheds sufficient light on the whole work of Laplace in probability. Laplace's theory of probability is subdivided into theory of probability proper, limit theorems and mathematical statistics (not yet distinguished as a separate entity). I maintain that in its very design Laplace's theory of probability is a discipline pertaining to natural science rather than to mathematics. I (...) maintain also the idea that the so-called Laplacian determinism was no hindrance to applications of his theory of probability to natural science and that one of his utterances in this connection could have well been made by Maxwell's contemporaries. Two possible reasons why the theory of probability stagnated after Laplace's work are singled out: the absence of new fields of application and, also, the insufficient level of mathematical abstraction used by Laplace. For all his achievements, I reach the general conclusion that he did not originate the theory of probability as it is now known. (shrink)

This article proposes a new model of human concept learning that provides a rational analysis of learning feature‐based concepts. This model is built upon Bayesian inference for a grammatically structured hypothesis space—a concept language of logical rules. This article compares the model predictions to human generalization judgments in several well‐known category learning experiments, and finds good agreement for both average and individual participant generalizations. This article further investigates judgments for a broad set of 7‐feature concepts—a more natural setting in several (...) ways—and again finds that the model explains human performance. (shrink)

In this book Hintikka brings together some of his most important historical studies. While all the papers have appeared earlier, he has expanded or revised several of these with the result that they exemplify common themes. However, the themes themselves find unity in the central aim of the book. Instead of doing analytical and critical studies of some issues in the history of epistemology, Hintikka is engaged in investigating historical perspectives in epistemology. He contends that to understand a thinker properly (...) "it is vital to know the conceptual landscape in which moving". It is only through a thorough understanding of the "conceptual topography" of a philosopher’s "intellectual landscape" that one can have a proper grasp of what the philosopher says. Once these assumptions are delineated, one can see the large scale differences between Plato and Frege, for example. An important feature of Hintikka’s approach is the rejection of what he calls "the fallacy of monolithic concepts". This is the assumption that a philosopher’s concepts exhibit solid uniformity and one harmonious pattern throughout. Rather, a careful analysis of a philosopher’s intellectual terrain reveals several different features running together in it. No uniform interpretation is possible! Thus, Hintikka attempts a partial but revealing interpretation of the position being studied. As he approaches the thought of each philosopher, he attempts to analyze and clarify one or more important features of the conceptual landscape which gives shape and point to the philosopher’s work. Who does Hintikka investigate in this book? (shrink)

While Hirst provides valuable insights into the thought of Bernard and of Durkheim, especially The Rules of Sociological Method, he does not attempt a full explanation of either man's thought. His goal is broader than that. Hirst's purpose in this book is "... to question and to challenge the dominant conceptions of epistemology in sociology.".

In this work Pollock attempts to recast the epistemological enterprise. Traditional epistemology has been centered on the search for truth conditions. It has been assumed that unless these are found the sceptic’s attack on knowledge claims cannot be conclusively answered. Pollock contends that traditional epistemologists have been barking up the wrong tree. The problem of epistemology is not to prove the trustworthiness of the justification condition. The proper task of epistemologists is to reveal the logical connection between the source of (...) our knowledge and the knowledge the source provides. This is to be done through an analysis of the meaning of statements, and the meaning of a statement is determined by the "justification conditions of it and its denial." Epistemological issues, such as perception, other minds, historical knowledge, a priori knowledge, amount to "nothing more than describing the justification conditions for statements in the different areas of knowledge." But, then what is meant by "justification conditions"? (shrink)

The purpose of this book is to lay to rest "fruitless controversy over mind and body" by developing a comprehensive theory of mind. The theory Matson argues for is mind-body identity. In developing his position he takes a hard materialist line: "... if sensations are brain processes then they cannot be... anything else." Yet, he asks, "What is the sentience? Why is there any such phenomenon? What difference does it make?" Rejecting dualism, he steers his materialist identity theory between two (...) mires: epiphenomenalism and behaviorism. His contention is that while sensations are brain processes, man is a sentient being and that sentience makes a difference. The difference sentience makes allows us to say that man is not a machine and is free. (shrink)

‘Ivravit in mea uerba tota Italia sponte sua et me belli quo uici ad Actium ducem depoposcit.’ In these words the Emperor Augustus clearly meant to suggest that the war in which he got rid of Mark Antony was none of his making, but was imposed upon him by the free and self-determined action of the Italian nation. Modern historians have unanimously refused to regard Augustus as a passive instrument in the hands of the Roman people at large; yet they (...) have generally accepted his account of the oath-taking of 32 B.C. as the outcome of a spontaneous burst of enthusiasm in his behalf, which they interpret as the reflex result of the nation's resentment against Antony's un-Roman and treasonable behaviour. (shrink)

Francis Bacon could imagine the delights of the promised land of science, but he stands today as a propagandist rather than a practitioner. He was no Copernicus or Vesalius or Galileo; he was not even a Gabriel Harvey or a Thomas Harriot. As James Stephens observes in this study he was "never able to provide examples of the interpretation of nature" adequate to validate his claims. A great deal of his thought was taken up not with new experiments but with (...) the problem of how to express the new scientific philosophy in a way that would be intellectually rigorous and at the same time appealing to at least the better educated members of a general audience. Not unlike some modern analytic philosophers, he felt that language is one of the prime causes of human error. The use of language had been systematized for the ancients in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, with later contribution by Isocrates, Cicero, Quintilian, and Seneca, among others. If men’s minds were corrupted by false rhetoric, Bacon’s solution was to offer a true rhetoric. (shrink)

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Stochastic Algorithms: Foundations and Applications, SAGA 2005, held in Moscow, Russia in October 2005. The 14 revised full papers presented together with 5 invited papers were carefully reviewed and selected for inclusion in the book. The contributed papers included in this volume cover both theoretical as well as applied aspects of stochastic computations whith a special focus on new algorithmic ideas involving stochastic decisions and the design and evaluation (...) of stochastic algorithms within realistic scenarios. (shrink)

The main question that Firestone & Scholl (F&S) pose is whether “what and how we see is functionally independent from what and how we think, know, desire, act, and so forth” (sect. 2, para. 1). We synthesize a collection of concerns from an interdisciplinary set of coauthors regarding F&S's assumptions and appeals to intuition, resulting in their treatment of visual perception as context-free.

This work is designed to answer both sceptical attacks on knowledge and epistemological relativism implied in the sceptic’s position. Rather than following the traditional path of developing a foundations picture along either rationalist or empiricist lines, Harrison turns to the resources of pure reason alone to repel the sceptic’s attacks and to find that about which we can be certain. Since the sceptic’s arguments "have been produced by reason, it is important if reason is going to be considered trustworthy that (...) they can also be answered by reason." Harrison’s thesis is that by reason alone "standards that judgments have to match up to if they are going to be thought of as judgments about the world" can be found. Such standards can be produced by an "inquiry into the essential conditions of our world being a comprehensible world.". (shrink)